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Abstract A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model
M but, for some model M, false at some world of M. We argue that there are such
truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s
definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with
an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically proper
account of validity. We counter recent arguments to the contrary presented in
Hanson’s ‘Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth’ (Philos Stud 130:437–459,
2006).
In a paper of 1988, Edward Zalta argues that there are logical truths and analytic
truths that are not necessary. Primary examples are instances of the schema
LA1 : A/ ! /
where / is some contingent claim, and A is the actuality operator. Take as an
example the sentence ‘If it is actually the case that Obama is president, then Obama
is president’. This sentence is contingent. The justification for this is straightfor-
ward. Given the contingency of the proposition [Obama is president], there is a
world at which it is false; i.e., a world, say w1, where Obama is not president. At w1,
the proposition [It is actually the case that Obama is president] is true, as that
proposition is a proposition not about w1 but the actual world, where Obama is
president. But then, at w1, the left side of our conditional is true and the right side
false, making the conditional itself false at w1 and so only contingently true at the
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actual world. All sides of the debate on which we are about to embark agree that
there are contingent instances of LA1.
What is controversial is whether or not all instances of LA1 are analytic and
logically true. Zalta argues that they are (and hence that we need to learn to live with
contingent logical and analytic truths). In his 2006, Hanson argues to the contrary,
defending the traditional connection between logical truth, analyticity, and
necessity. In this paper we consider Hanson’s case and argue that LA1 is indeed
a logical and analytic truth.
1 Formal preliminaries and Zalta’s argument
Whether or not all instances of LA1 are logically true depends on the notion of
logical truth one adopts. In their pioneering work on the logic of the actuality
operator, Crossley and Humberstone (1977) distinguish two distinct notions of
validity, which they dub general and real-world validity. We shall first characterize
these competing notions, relate the choice between these notions to the logical status
of LA1, and then turn to the matter of defending a choice of real-world validity over
general validity.
Both definitions assume that a model M of modal logic is a structure of the form
hW, wa, Vi, where W is a set of possible worlds, wa is a distinguished world in W,
and V is a valuation function that assigns a set of worlds to each atomic sentence of
the language.1 In what follows, we shall assume an S5 propositional modal logic
and so we need not include an accessibility relation, which will play no role in what
follows. Moreover, we shall use ‘model’ and ‘interpretation’ interchangeably, since
some authors use the former while others use the latter in talking about the same
set-theoretic structure.
Let us assume that the definition of truthM of a formula / at a world w (i.e.,
M; w/) has been given recursively in the standard way.2 Then the notion of real-
world validity is defined in terms of the notion of truth in a model: / is trueMðM  /Þ
just in case / is true at the distinguished world wa in M (i.e., M / iff M; wa  /).
We now define real-world validity as: a formula / is R-valid just in case / is true in
every model M, i.e., 8MðM /Þ.
By contrast, the definition of general validity bypasses the notion of truth in a
model and defines validity directly from the notion of truth at a world in the model,
as follows: / is G-valid just in case, for every model M and every world w [ WM,
1 We shall not be discussing those modal logicians who eliminate altogether the actual world from the
models of modal logic. Those logicians face two further problems, namely, that there seems to be no way
for them to introduce an actuality operator and there is no way to define the notion of truth in a model if
no reference to a distinguished actual world can be made (as done below).
2 I.e., as follows:
1. When / is an atomic sentence letter p; M; w/ iff w [ VM(p)
2. When / has the form :w; M; w/ iff it is not the case that M; ww
3. When / has the form w ! v; M; w/ iff either it is not the case that M; ww or M; w  v
4. When / has the form hw, then M; w/ iff for every world w2W; M; w  w.
We can then define the other truth-connectives and  in the standard ways.
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/ is trueM at w, i.e., iff 8M8wðM; w/). Thus, G-validity is not defined in terms of
the notion of truth in a model (M /).
Intuitively and informally, a formula is R-valid just in case, for every model, it is
true at the distinguished world of the model. A formula is G-valid, on the other
hand, just in case, for every model, it is true in every world of the model. So,
whereas the G-validity of a formula involves its truth value at counterfactual worlds
of the models, its R-validity does not.
The choice between these competing definitions of validity determines the
logical status of instances of LA1. While every instance of LA1 is true in every
model M, for every contingent instance w of LA1, there is a model M and world
w2WM , where w is not the distinguished world of M, such that w is falseM at
w. Hence, while every instance of LA1 is R-valid, there are instances of LA1 that
are not G-valid. This follows from the definition of the two notions of validity and
the fact that there are contingent instances of LA1.
Zalta argues that the proper way to understand the notion of logical truth
excludes G-validity as a genuine kind of logical truth. The argument turns on the
role that the notion of truth in a model plays in our intuitive conception of logical
truth. It is argued that only the notion of R-validity respects this role.3 The idea is
that the most fundamental semantic notion is that of truth in a model. Logical truth
is then explicated as truth in every model. Truth invariance under permutation of the
interpretation of the nonlogical vocabulary is what it is to be logically true. This
establishes an intimate connection between truth in a model and logical truth. But
the notion of truth in a model does not play this foundational role in the definition of
G-validity. A formula is G-valid, recall, just in case it is true for every model M and
world w. The notion of G-validity thus by-passes the notion of truth in a model and
thus does not respect the foundational role this notion plays. So G-validity does not
characterize a kind of genuine logical truth.
2 Hanson’s first two problems
Hanson raises two problems with Zalta’s argument for the primacy of the notion of
R-validity. First, he challenges the claim that Tarski’s (1936) definition of logical
truth, which is in terms of an extensional (i.e., nonmodal) language, carries over to a
nonextensional (i.e., modal) language (Hanson 2006, p. 442).4 Second, he claims
that, with a minor modification, the proponent of G-validity can explicate the notion
of logical truth in terms of truth in a model. We consider each claim in turn.
It is true that Tarski’s work on logical truth was carried out in the context of a
nonmodal language and so when we move to a modal language certain changes and
additions are necessary. But we claim that Tarski provided us with a proper
3 See Zalta (1988, p. 66).
4 For the purposes of this paper, we will consider the language of propositional logic to be extensional
and the language of propositional modal logic to be nonextensional. But see Zalta (1993), where it is
argued that when propositions are assigned as the denotations of the sentence letters in propositional
modal logic, the language of propositional modal logic becomes extensional.
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understanding of the notion of logical truth as truth under every interpretation.5 This
basic insight should not be altered, no matter what new languages we go on to
consider. What will change is what constitutes an interpretation of the language in
question. The basic conception of logical truth as truth across all interpretations
should remain the same, even when we move from a nonmodal to a modal language.
Our response to Hanson’s first claim, then, is simply this. We agree that one should
expect there to be changes in the semantic definitions when we move from
nonmodal to modal languages, but we think those changes should take place in the
definition of an interpretation and not the definition of logical truth. It does not
follow from the fact that interpretations of modal languages are more complex
structures that the definition logical truth has to change. Thus, Hanson has not
offered a reason to think that the concept of logical truth changes when we move
from a nonmodal to a modal language.
Hanson’s second objection grants for the sake of argument that preserving
Tarski’s definition of logical truth is a virtue. He then argues that it is a virtue that
the proponent of G-validity can have as well by a simple addition of an extra
parameter to a model. Classical models of modal logic are set-theoretic triples
consisting of a set of worlds, a distinguished actual world, and a valuation function
(omitting accessibility relations). Hanson suggests adding a new element, namely, a
‘‘designated member of W’’ named w* (442), which plays one of the roles the
distinguished actual world plays in the original model theory. Models become
defined as quadruples of the form hW ; wa; w; Vi. The semantics of the actuality
operator A is still sensitive to the distinguished actual world of the model. But the
notion of truth in a model, which the proponent of R-validity identifies as truth in the
model at the distinguished actual world wa of the model, is now redefined in terms
of the newly added designated world parameter w*. With this new element in place,
Hanson offers the following redefinition of truth in a model:
/ is true in a model M just in case w 2 Vð/Þ:
Now that he has a notion of ‘‘truth in a model,’’ he can then go on to employ the
Tarskian definition of logical truth as truth in every model. But, because the
distinguished actual world wa need not be identical to the designated world w*,
there will be models where instances of LA1 are false. For example, let M be a
model with two worlds, w1 and w2, where w1 is the distinguished world and w2 the
designated world, and let w1 [ V(p) and w2 62VðpÞ. Then Ap ! p is false in
M. So, with this simple addition, the proponent of G-validity can accept the
Tarskian definition of logical truth as truth in every model and still deny all
instances of LA1 the status of logical truth. Zalta’s Tarskian argument in favor of
R-validty, Hanson concludes, fails.
This response does not satisfy. The Tarskian definition of logical truth is
philosophically illuminating. The desire to respect and retain that philosophical
insight is what motivated Zalta’s original argument in favor of R-validity.
5 For the purposes of this paper, we won’t take a stand on what the primary bearers of truth are. We think
there are good reasons to suppose that an appeal to propositions should be made. This is something Tarski
doesn’t do, and so, our assessment of Tarski’s notion as ‘proper’ should be understood modulo the
assumption, which we reject, that sentences or formulae are the primary bearers of truth.
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Furthermore, the presence of a distinguished actual world in a Kripke model for
modal languages is philosophically illuminating. We have an idea of what role the
distinguished actual world plays and modal logicians have seen a need for
something to play that role. But Hanson’s addition of a ‘designated’ world seems to
us a parameter without intuitive motivation and grounding, especially when we are
told that this floats free from the distinguished actual world. The philosophical
insight seems lost.
It is natural to think that what is the case is what is true simpliciter. It is simply
true that snow is white. The notion of truth in a model is meant to mimic this natural
thought, supposing the (intended) model to represent what is the case. But what is
the case is what is actually the case. This demonstrates that the two roles the
proponent of R-validity assigns the distinguished actual world—namely, being the
element of the model to which the A-operator is sensitive and being the element of
the model in terms of which the notion of truth in a model is defined—should be
played by a single object. But, of course, if the distinguished actual world and
designated world of a model are always the same, then LA1 is once again reinstated
as a logical truth, even with Hanson’s modification. Hanson’s proposal delivers the
result of allowing the proponent of G-validity to operate with a Tarskian definition
of logical truth only by undermining the philosophical insight that that definition
promises. We conclude, then, that Hanson’s second objection to Zalta’s argument
fails.
3 Hanson’s defense of G-validity
So far we have discussed Hanson’s objections to Zalta’s arguments for preferring
R-validity. We now turn to Hanson’s positive argument in favor of G-validity,
offered in Sect. 2 of his paper.
In his monograph of 1989, Kaplan argued that the logic of demonstratives gives
rise to contingent logical truths. His favorite example is ‘I am here now’. Zalta
argued that such examples are not the most basic examples of contingent logical
truths. Every genuinely logical truth is analytic, in a strict sense of being true in
virtue of its meaning alone. But the meaning of the sentence ‘I am here now’ does
not, by itself, determine a truth value. It is only relative to a context that the sentence
can be said to be true or false, on Kaplan’s view. Zalta argues that this is, at best, an
extended notion of analyticity.
We cannot consider the truth of the sentence [‘I am here now’] without
appealing to some context, and so we cannot simply say that it has the
property that traditional analytic truths have, namely, being true in virtue of
the meanings of its words. Rather, it has the property of being true in all
contexts in virtue of the meanings of its words relative to such contexts. (1988,
p. 71)
Hanson tries to turn this reasoning against Zalta. He presents an analogous argument
against the validity of LA1:
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We cannot consider the truth of the sentence without appealing to some actual-
world candidate, and so we cannot simply say that it has the property that
traditional analytic truths have, namely, being true in virtue of the meanings of
its words. Rather, it has the property of being true in all actual-world
candidates in virtue of the meanings of its words relative to such actual-world
candidates.
In summary, Hanson claims that Zalta’s own reasons for doubting that ‘I am here
now’ is a genuine logical truth carry over to instances of LA1.
But we think that there is an important difference between requiring a context
and requiring a distinguished actual world. Consider a paradigm example of a
logically true sentence in a formal, nonmodal propositional language: p ? p, for
example. Like any formula, this formula is only true relative to a model. Similarly,
the formula Ap ! p is only true relative to a model. But, unlike Kaplan’s ‘I am here
now’, all that we need to supply is a model; we don’t need anything other than an
interpretation (which we believe requires a distinguished actual world if truth for
modal claims is to be definable). So the claim Ap ! p is true in virtue of the
meaning of its words in exactly the same sense as classical examples of logical
truths are true in virtue of the meanings of their words. Hanson’s argument fails to
establish an analogy as it fails to appreciate the difference between the need to
supply an interpretation and the need to supply an interpretation and a context.
4 Considering a counterfactual world as actual
We take ourselves to have answered Hanson’s objections to Zalta’s original
argument in favor of R-validity and objected to Hanson’s positive arguments in
favor of G-validity. We’d like to conclude with a discussion of a notion that he
employs in his defense of G-validity that we find problematic. It is the notion of
‘‘truth at w from the point of view of w0’’ or ‘‘truth at counterfactual world w0 when
considering w0 as actual.’’ (This notion is widely used in the literature on two-
dimensional modal logic but we won’t be discussing that literature explicitly here.)
We first discuss the ways in which Hanson employs this notion and then argue that it
is problematic. The upshot of these criticisms is that there is only one way to
‘‘consider’’ a counterfactual world and that is as counterfactual. Insofar as Hanson’s
defense of G-validity requires otherwise, we maintain that to be further evidence
against that defense.
Hanson tells us (444) that the notion of R-validity is based on Evans’s (1982)
notion of truth in a possible situation and the notion of G-validity is based on
Evans’s notion of truth with respect to a possible situation. Evans’s notion of truth
in a possible situation w is glossed in terms of what would have been true were
w actual. His notion of truth with respect to a situation is ‘‘purely internal to the
semantic theory ... need[ing] no independent explanation’’ and is that in terms of
which modal operators and ordinary counterfactuals are explicated (Evans 1979,
p. 207). To capture the distinction, Hanson introduces the notion of a point of view.
The idea is supposed to be that when we evaluate a formula at a world w, we can
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evaluate it from the point of view of w itself or, supposing w to be a counterfactual
world, from the point of view of the actual world. If the formula is sensitive to
which world is actual, then this can make a difference. For example, suppose
w 62VMðpÞ and wa 2 VMðpÞ. Then the formula Ap is false in w considered as actual
(or ‘‘from the point of view’’ of w) and yet true with respect to w considered as
counterfactual (or ‘‘from the point of view’’ of wa). (Similarly, if w2VMðpÞ and
wa 62 VMðpÞ, then the formula Ap is true in w considered as actual and false with
respect to w considered as counterfactual.) Intuitively, when we evaluate the
formula in w considered as actual, we are allowing A to ‘‘pick out’’ w, in the sense
that the truth value of A/ in w is dependent on the truth value of / in w. When we
evaluate that formula with respect to w considered as counterfactual, on the other
hand, we keep A fixed on wa, in the sense that the truth value of A/ is dependent on
the truth value of / in wa.
The above distinction between two ways of evaluating a formula with respect to a
world gives rise to ‘‘two notions’’ of necessity: what Evans calls deep and
superficial necessity. A formula / is deeply necessary just in case it is true in every
possible world, in the sense that, for every world w, / is true at w considered as
actual. A formula / is superficially necessary just in case it is true with respect to
every possible world, in the sense that, for every world w, / is true at w considered
as counterfactual. Suppose again that w 62 VMðpÞ and wa 2 VMðpÞ. Then Ap is
superficially necessary because it is true at wa and at w considered as
counterfactual. However, Ap is not deeply necessary, because it is false at
w considered as actual and so it is not true at all worlds considered as actual. On
Evans’s view, the ‘‘necessary’’ truth of Ap, given p’s actual but contingent truth, is
superficial as it depends on a contingent feature of reality; namely, the truth value of
p. A deeply necessary truth, on the other hand, is free of such contingency. Evans
thought that this fact is captured by claiming that these truths are true no matter
which world were actual.6
We can now return to Hanson’s employment of these notions. Hanson grounds
his understanding of ‘‘point of view’’ in his conception of ‘truth at world’. He says:
The basic semantic clauses for the necessity, possibility, and actuality
connectives are the same under both real world and general validity, and both
notions of validity make use of the idea that a sentence has a truth value at a
world from the point of view of some other world. (445)
We think the second conjunct here is simply false; we see no reason to think that the
semantics for modal logic outlined at the beginning of this paper makes use of the
idea that a sentence has a truth value at a world from the point of view of some other
world. By inspection one can see that the semantics defines only the notion of truth
at (i.e., M; w/), and it does not follow from the fact that the second index is a
variable ranging over worlds that a sentence has a truth value at a world from the
point of view of some other world, even when the variable w takes the distinguished
6 In a very influential paper, Davies and Humberstone (1980) propose to formalize this distinction in
terms of two modal operators—h (superficial necessity) and their proposed FA (read ‘fixedly-actual’, for
deep necessity), as we shall discuss below.
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world as its value. The semantics only employs truth at a counterfactual world
considered as counterfactual.
Hanson then goes on to attempt to align R-validity with Evans’s truth in a
situation. For example, he says: (444)
Indeed making use of the notion of point of view, it is easy to see that the
fundamental property on which the definition of real world validity is based is
the following
(R) Truth at a world w from the point of view of w as actual.
This also strikes us as mistaken. What drives the proponent of R-validity is the idea
that a formula is true in a model just in case it is true in the distinguished actual
world of that model. There is no need for two world indices and no need for the
notion of a point of view. If there is such a thing as a point of view, it is provided by
the model as a whole and does not shift within the model. That is to say, the
proponent of R-validity is interested in a cross-model feature—namely, whether or
not the formula is true at the distinguished world of every model. But Hanson’s
notion of truth at a world from the point of view of that world does not capture a
cross-model feature but rather an intra-model feature. So, it is a mistake to think that
the proponent of R-validity has a use for the notion of truth at a counterfactual world
considered as actual. It is only the the proponent of G-validity that has a use for such
a notion.
Hanson’s second use of the distinction between considering a world as actual and
considering that world as counterfactual occurs in the third section of his paper, in
an attempt to explain away the intuitions supporting R-validity. The proponent of
R-validity is, as Hanson sees it, impressed by the fact that, for any world w;A/ and
/ have the same truth value in w considered as actual.7 Hanson claims to be able to
accomodate this insight in his framework for G-validity by introducing a distinct
kind of necessity operator—what Davies and Humberstone call the fixedly-actual
operator FA, defined as follows: M; wFA/ just in case for every M0 just like
M except that w0 is the distinguished actual world, M0; w0 / (Davies and
Humberstone 1980, p. 2). In other words, M; wFA/ iff in every model M0 that
differs from M only by which world in the set W of M is identified as actual, / is
trueM0 at the distinguished actual world of M
0. Now Hanson would render this clause
as follows: FA/ is true at w iff for every world w0, / is true at w0 when w0 is
considered as actual. While A/  / is not necessary, it is fixedly-actual and so,
claims Hanson, the basic insight supporting R-validity is accommodated within his
framework for G-validity, enriched with Davies and Humberstone’s FA operator.
Whereas the proponent of R-validity would say every instance of LA1 is logically
true, Hanson would say that every instance involving contingent propositions is
merely fixedly-actual.
We have seen some of the purposes to which Hanson puts the distinction between
considering a counterfactual world as actual and considering a counterfactual world
as counterfactual. It is time now to say more generally what is wrong with
7 We have rejected this characterization of the motivations of the proponent of R-validity in the previous
paragraph.
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employing this kind of discourse in the analysis of modality. While we do not take
our discussion to be decisive, we do think that it raises a legitimate concern. The
basic problem is that this kind of discourse fails to adequately separate the formal
and material mode of speech, and that such a failure calls into question whether such
discourse even makes sense.
This problem arises from what we take to be a normal understanding of the
enterprise of modal logic. Basically, as we understand it, the analysis of modal
discourse is an enterprise which assumes a certain target language and its
regimentation: the target language is natural language (which contains modal
locutions of various sorts) and its regimentation consists of systematic translations
of natural language sentences into the formal language of modal logic. The
enterprise also assumes that one may use a theoretical language (such as the
language of set theory with the addition of quantifiers over possible worlds) which
contains no modal locutions, for the purpose of indirectly interpretating the target
discourse by directly interpreting its regimentation.8 But when Hanson (and others)
talk about ‘considering a nonactual possible world as actual’, he is essentially
importing modal notions into the modally-innocent theoretical language of
interpretation. For the idea of considering a nonactual possible world w as actual
can only be understood as a request to suppose what it would be like were w actual,
and this is obviously just modal talk about worlds. So, on formal grounds alone, it
seems illegitimate to appeal to the notion of ‘considering a world as actual’ in the
semantics of modal logic.
To put the objection another way, note that the notion of considering a
counterfactual world as actual requires that actuality be a contingent property of a
world. But the framework of possible worlds was invoked, in part, to explain the
modal notion of contingency. Thus it is not clear to us that it makes sense to apply
contingency talk to the very entities that are used to explain contingency.
We think this concern at least shifts the burden of proof. For our argument
suggests that those who insist on using the notion of considering a counterfactual
world as actual should demonstrate that it makes sense to do so.
5 Conclusion
We have defended Zalta’s contention, that R-validity rather than G-validity is the
proper notion of logical truth for modal languages, against Hanson’s objections. We
argued that the Tarskian notion of logical truth as truth in every model is
philosophically illuminating and can be carried over from nonmodal logic to modal
logic simply by adding a distinguished world to interpretations along with the
8 Menzel (1990), and others (e.g., Ray 1996, Chihara 1998), have employed modal locutions in the
semantics. For example, in Menzel (1990) there is a semantics for modal logic which goes roughly as
follows: a modal statement like ‘It is possible that p’ is true just in case there is a non-modal, set-
theoretically described Tarksi-model in which p is true which might have been a model of the actual
world. Note here that Menzel is not applying modal talk to possible worlds, i.e., he is not applying modal
talk to entities introduced for the purpose of explaining modal talk. Instead, he is applying it to things he
believes we already accept, such as the applied set theory used in defining Tarski models.
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domain of possible worlds. Furthermore, the proponent of G-validity cannot mimic
this notion of logical truth, as Hanson suggests, by adding an extra element (i.e., a
designated world) to an interpretation already containing a distinguished actual
world. In addition to the arguments we developed by way of answering Hanson’s
objections, we also developed a positive argument against the idea that G-validity is
the philosophically deeper notion of logical truth and gave voice to a concern about
the distinction between considering a counterfactual world as counterfactual and as
actual.
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